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Fiscal Adjustment and the Costs of Public Debt 





We use a panel of 21 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009 to investigate the effects of 
different fiscal adjustment strategies on long-term interest rates – a key fiscal indicator 
reflecting the costs of government debt service. A government confronted with high deficits 
and rising debt will sooner or later need to enact fiscal adjustments in order to avoid solvency 
problems. Over the last four decades, such measures taken by governments in OECD 
countries have varied in duration, size, composition and in their success to re-establish fiscal 
sustainability. Controlling for various economic, fiscal and political factors, we find that the 
size and the composition of a fiscal adjustment significantly affect interest rates as well as 
yield spreads. Adjustments that are relatively large and those that primarily depend on 
expenditure cuts lead to substantially lower long-term interest rates. However, periods of 
fiscal adjustments do not generally have an influence on interest rates, even if they were 
successful and led to lower deficits and debt levels. Instead, financial markets only seem to 
value strict and decisive measures – a clear sign that the government’s pledge to cut the 
deficit is credible. 
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1.  Introduction  
In 2008/09, fiscal policy of many countries was concerned with stabilizing the plunging econ-
omy. While the exact composition of the fiscal stimulus was controversially discussed, there 
was a widespread agreement that together with central bank interventions a distinct fiscal pol-
icy impulse was required this time (Spilimbergo, Symansky, Blanchard and Cottarelli, 2008; 
Elmendorf and Furman, 2008; OECD, 2009a). However, extended fiscal packages have 
pushed up public debt to an unprecedented level in post World War II history of close to 
100% for 2010 on the OECD average (OECD, 2009b). In addition, even before the crisis fis-
cal sustainability was not fulfilled in many OECD countries (Afonso and Rault, 2007). The 
drastic increase of government indebtedness thereby met numerous countries unprepared. 
Therefore, the question of adequate “exit-strategies” probably represents one of the most im-
portant questions in public finance to be resolved in the coming years.  
In order to meet the requirements of long-term fiscal sustainability, sooner or later many gov-
ernments have to implement more or less austere fiscal consolidation policies. Substantial 
research efforts have been attempted to the macroeconomic effects of these fiscal adjustments 
as well as to identifying those determinants that favor long-lasting and sustainable consolida-
tions.
1 In a pioneering work, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) study two major fiscal contractions 
in Denmark (1983-1986) and in Ireland (1987-1989) that were associated with surprising 
immediate non-Keynesian expansionary economic effects. The explanation brought up by the 
two authors (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996) as well as by Bertola and Drazen (1993) is that the 
wealth effect on consumption by a credibly announced long-lasting spending cut offsets the 
Keynesian recessive impact of reduced public spending (the expectation view). Note that 
according to that argument, the size of the fiscal contraction is decisive for causing expan-
sionary effects as it signals a credible policy change whereas only small adjustments fail to 
persuade consumers anticipating their consumption to a higher level of income. In fact, Suth-
erland (1997), Zaghini (2001), von Hagen et al. (2002) and Ardagna (2004) provide evidence 
that sizeable adjustment policies are changing expectations on future tax liabilities and con-
                                                            
1   In the literature on the political economy of reform, some authors argue that the severity of the crisis is an 
important aspect in successfully implementing reform policies (Krueger, 1993 or Williamson, 1994). How-
ever, as Rodrik (1996) states, the argument that crisis cause reform is not free of tautology. Reform is only a 
political issue when actual policies are perceived not to be working. Thus, the emphasis on crisis may not be 
a good explanation as to what form of adjustment will be taken.  3 
 
sequently boost aggregate demand immediately, especially in periods of fiscal stress, where a 
consolidation of the unsustainable path of fiscal policy is to be expected sooner or later.
2  
In an extension to the literature, Alesina and Perotti (1997), Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and 
Guichard et al. (2007) provide a non-mutually exclusive explanation for a successful fiscal 
stabilization through the effects on the labor market and the cost side of the firms (the labor 
market view or composition view). They show that expansionary fiscal consolidations are 
more likely if they are relying primarily on spending cuts. Even in the case where the adjust-
ments are of the same size in terms of reducing the primary budget deficit, cutting back 
spending induces a more promising consolidation than tax increases. In addition, they argue 
that the composition of spending cuts matters. Especially successful deficit-to-GDP and debt-
to-GDP reductions are associated with cuts on government transfers, welfare spending and 
government wages. However, if the budget consolidation relays on reductions of public in-
vestments, the adjustments tend to be unsuccessful.  
Ardagna (2004) evaluated the relative importance of the two explanations. She provides evi-
dence that the composition of the stabilization policy matters for economic growth mainly 
through a labor market induced effect by moderate wage agreements. The size of the fiscal 
contraction is key when it comes to fighting rising debts. Ardagna’s empirical findings indi-
cate that when governments engage in sizeable fiscal adjustments, the probability of success 
in the sense of a long-lasting debt reduction almost doubles.  
While much research effort has been devoted to the question of which policy measure is par-
ticularly apt to support a successful fiscal consolidation and to the macroeconomic conse-
quences of fiscal adjustments, the effect of fiscal adjustments on the costs of public debts ser-
vice is much less elaborated. Do fiscal adjustments have an effect on the cost of public debt 
service?  
 
Empirical evidence for the more general question of the impact of fiscal imbalances on long-
term interest rates is mixed so far. Theoretically, government deficits as well as government 
debt could have an impact on treasury yields depending on the underlying model. Amongst 
others, important factors include the structure of debt-holders, the induced crowding-out of 
private capital and the underlying reason of deficits as cyclical or structural (Laubach, 2003). 
Since it is not easy to isolate these effects empirically, estimates vary widely in size as well as 
                                                            
2   Perotti (1999) provides empirical evidence that deficit cuts are more likely to be expansionary in times where 
public debts are high.  4 
 
in their sign (Perotti, 2005; Ardagna, Caselli, Lane, 2004; Chinn and Frankel, 2005; Thomas 
and Wu, 2009). However, the impact of large, discretionary fiscal policy changes has rarely 
been investigated. Ardagna (2009) evaluates the reaction of financial markets around episodes 
of larges fiscal contractions as well as expansions, concluding that the costs of public debt 
service are sensitive to distinct changes in fiscal discipline. Our paper bases on Ardagna 
(2009) and evaluates the impact of fiscal adjustments on changes of the cost of public debt 
service. Additionally, we analyze the effect of success, the size and the composition of fiscal 
adjustments on long-term interest rates. Our results suggest that real interest rates and yield 
spreads of long-term government bonds significantly honor large and expenditure-based fiscal 
adjustments as compared to small and revenue-based adjustments that have rarely an impact –  
independent of the fact whether the consolidation process proved to be long-lasting or not.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides information on the empirical method and 
on the data set we use for our empirical analysis. In section 3 we first focus on the interpreta-
tion of descriptive findings around the episodes of fiscal adjustments followed by section 4 
with the empirical analysis.  Section 5 is devoted to some robustness checks whereas section 6 
offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2.  Data and methodological issues  
2.1.  Data 
In order to empirically evaluate the effect of different fiscal consolidation strategies on the 
cost of public debt service, we use annual data on 21 OECD countries covering a maximum 
time span from 1970 to 2009. The countries in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the 
United States. Data for all other OECD member countries were either missing altogether or 
incomplete and could thus not be included in the analysis. All fiscal and macroeconomic data 
are from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 86 database (OECD, 2009b). Data on political 
control variables are from various sources. A description of all variables and sources is pro-
vided in Appendix A.  
 
2.2.  Methodological issues 
When analyzing strategies and implementations of fiscal adjustments, ideally one would like 
to know the exact date the new policy was announced and could then examine the reaction of 5 
 
financial markets as well as the entire economy. Furthermore, it would be useful to have in-
formation about the maturity of all bonds outstanding, a track record of past debt service and 
details about the structure of government debt (share of domestic and foreign bond holders, 
share of debt in local and foreign currency).
3 Such information is hard to gather for a panel of 
more than 20 countries and a time span of 40 years. Over the last few years, fiscal variables 
have become available on a quarterly or even monthly basis. However, such data only cover a 
short time period. Moreover, quarterly or monthly fiscal data might not be very meaningful. 
For example, while some taxes as the VAT are collected throughout the year, revenue from 
the income tax is often generated once a year and is therefore concentrated over a few 
months.
4  Expenditures on the other hand are more balanced throughout the year. This leads to 
fiscal contractions and fiscal expansions which do not reflect any policy changes, but are 
merely a statistical artifact. We thus use annual data to determine the point in time when a 
fiscal adjustment took place. In line with the existing literature, we also look at the three years 
that preceded the adjustment and the three years that followed.   
 
2.3.  Definitions of fiscal adjustments 
Our method to identify episodes of budget consolidation is almost identical with the defini-
tions used by Alesina and Perotti (1997), von Hagen, Hughes Hallett and Strauch (2001), 
Mierau, Jong-A-Pin and de Haan (2007), Ardagna (2004) and others. Episodes are selected on 
the basis of large changes of the cyclically adjusted primary deficit (CAPB) as calculated by 
the OECD, expressed as a percentage of GDP. Using the CAPB measure has the advantage 
that business cycle fluctuations such as changes in inflation and real interest rates are factored 
in. Since this measure also excludes interest payments, this definition largely reflects changes 
in discretionary fiscal policy. However, the CAPB has been criticized because it can be dis-
torted by asset prices, extraordinary expenditure or windfall gains.
5 In the October edition of 
its World Economic Outlook, the IMF (2010) argued that using a statistical concept to define 
episodes of fiscal consolidation is a highly imperfect measure of actual policy actions. The 
IMF argues that the CAPB concept suffers from measurement errors that are likely to be cor-
                                                            
3 For example, Haugh, Ollivaud and Turner (2009) examine the determinants of sovereign risk premiums includ-
ing factors such as the history of fiscal deficits, the share of interest payments of total government receipts, pro-
jected fiscal balance and yield spread between corporate and government bonds. Using semi-annual data, their 
analysis covers only four years, however.  
4 See for example monthly data under the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS). Taking Switzer-
land (2009) as an example, it is evident that more than half of total tax revenue collected was generated between 
March (when tax returns are filled out) and June (when taxes are due). The last four months of the year on the 
other hand generated only 20% of total tax revenue.  
5 See for example Girouard and Price (2004), Koen and van den Noord (2005) or the OECD (2007).  6 
 
related with economic developments, thereby downplaying contractionary effects and over-
stating expansionary effects of fiscal adjustment. The IMF uses an action based approach by 
relying on various reports by the OECD, the IMF and national sources to examine what coun-
tries actually did. However, this approach does not solve the problem of endogeneity as the 
reasons, intentions and discussions that led to changes in fiscal policy are not evaluated. Po-
tential implementation lags or ripple effects are also neglected. We thus use the standard me-
thodology in the literature by defining thresholds.
6     
 
Consequently, our definition reads as follows: First, a period of fiscal adjustment is a time 
span in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance (the primary balance) improves by at 
least 1.5 per cent of GDP in each year or by at least 1.2 per cent of GDP in two consecutive 
years. Second, a period of fiscal adjustment is successful if gross financial liabilities as a per-
centage of GDP are reduced by at least 5 percentage points in the three years following the 
adjustment.  
 
While the two definitions used are almost identical with the existing literature, they are none-
theless relatively strict and thus do not include small adjustments that are undertaken over a 
prolonged period. Since it is the aim of our analysis to look only at substantial changes in fis-
cal policy, we also need to look at alternative measures to ensure that our results do not de-
pend on the particular definition used. This is done in section 4.2. 
 
3.  Descriptive findings 
Table 1 summarizes all episodes of fiscal adjustments over the past four decades using the 
definition of the cyclically adjusted primary balance. With the exception of France and Ger-
many, all 21 countries experienced at least one year of budget consolidation as determined by 
an improvement in the cyclically adjusted primary balance. Countries like Greece, Portugal, 
Italy and Sweden even experienced eight or more years of fiscal adjustments. Overall, 62 fis-
cal adjustments took place between 1970 and 2009, covering 91 periods.  
 
As table 2 shows, only 19 of those adjustments – a share of 31 percent – were successful. Ex-
pressed in the number of years affected, 37 of 91 periods covered were part of a successful 
budget consolidation, a share of 41 percent. When using the same definition for fiscal adjust-
                                                            
6 Further arguments in favor of the standard methodology can be found on Alberto Alesina’s homepage: 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/alesina/Alesina.  7 
 
ments, but based upon the primary balance instead of the cyclically adjusted primary balance, 
all countries in the sample went through a period of budget consolidation at least once. 
 
Figures 1 through 3 describe the periods of fiscal adjustments in more detail. The consolida-
tion periods are spread unevenly over the course of time. They are particularly concentrated in 
the middle of the 1980’s when average gross debt was rising rapidly and then again in the 
middle and later part of the 1990’s when average debt reached new heights and many Euro-
pean countries were forced to consolidate in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact.
7 
 










      
  Australia  1 2 2  1986-87 
  Austria  3 4 0  1984,  1996-97,  2001 
 Belgium  5  5  2  1977, 1982, 1984, 1987, 1993 
  Canada  3 6 3  1981,  1986-87,  1995-97 
  Denmark  2 6 6  1983-86,  2004-05 
 Finland  6  6  1  1981, 1984, 1988, 1994, 1998, 2000 
  France  0 0 0  - 
  Germany  0 0 0  - 
  Greece  4 8 5  1986-87,  1991-94, 1996, 2005 
  Ireland  2 5 3  1983-84,  1986-1988 
 Italy  6  8  0  1976-77, 1982-83, 1991, 1993, 1995, 2006 
  Japan  1 1 0  1984 
  Luxembourg  2 3 0  1993-94,  1997 
  Netherlands 4 4 2  1972,  1983,  1991,  1993 
 New Zealand  5  6  5  1987, 1989, 1993-94, 2000, 2002 
 Portugal  5  8  0  1982-1984, 1986, 1992, 1995, 2006-07 
  Spain  2 2 0  1987,  1992 
 Sweden  6  9  4  1976, 1981, 1983-84, 1986-87, 1996-97, 2000 
  Switzerland 1 1 0  2000 
  United  Kingdom  3 6 4  1980,  1982,  1995-1998 
 United States  1  1  0  1976 
 Total  62  91  37   







7 For a survey on the empirical assessment of the impact of the Stability and Growth Pact and other fiscal rules 
on the evolvement of public debts, see IMF (2009). 8 
 






    
 Australia  2   1986-87 
 Belgium  2   1987, 1993 
 Canada  3   1995-97 
 Denmark  6   1983-86, 2004-05 
 Finland  1   1998 
 Greece  5   1991-94, 2005 
 Ireland  3   1986-1988 
 Netherlands  2   1972, 1993 
 New Zealand  5   1987, 1993-94, 2000, 2002 
 Sweden  4   1986-87, 1996-97 
 United Kingdom  4   1995-98 
 Total 37    
 
The current surge in debt in almost all OECD countries suggests that we will see another con-
centration of fiscal adjustments over the next few years. Only 11 of 19 countries in consolida-
tion ended up being successful. Over time, there is a trend that fiscal adjustments are more 
likely to be successful, though. In the 1970’s, only 14 percent of all adjustments were success-
ful. This percentage rose to 33 percent in the 1980’s and 53 percent in the 1990’s and has re-
mained stable since.  
 
Figure 1: Episodes of fiscal adjustments and average gross debt  
 
 
As figures 2 and 3 show, most adjustments were relatively small in size and lasted only for a 
short period of time. More than half of all adjustments saw an improvement of the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance between 1.5 and 2.5 percent of GDP. In more than two out of three 
cases, the budget consolidation lasted for only one year. Overall, the average adjustment pe-9 
 
riod lasted 1.5 years. The figures seem to reflect that the measures taken were more likely to 
be successful the larger the size of the adjustment. If the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
improved by more than 6 percentage points, the consolidation was successful in five of six 
cases observed and failed only once in the case of Portugal (1982-1984). Similarly, five of the 
six adjustments that lasted more than two years were successful.       
 
Figure 2: Episodes of fiscal adjustments: Success and size of adjustment (% of GDP) 
 
 
Figure 3: Episodes of fiscal adjustments: Success and duration (number of years) 
 
Table 3 shows that in line with the literature, countries with successful adjustments faced 
higher interest rates, higher debt and higher expenditure before and during budget consolida-
tion. The size of the adjustment as expressed by the change in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance was very similar, however. The major difference was in the composition of the ad-
justment. Successful adjustments relied primarily on expenditure cuts, reducing expenditure 
by 1.5 percent of GDP during consolidation. In unsuccessful cases, expenditure was cut by 10 
 
only 0.2 percent. Instead, the deficit was reduced by raising taxes as indicated by the increase 
in revenue by 1.3 percent. Revenue increased by 0.8 percent of GDP during successful ad-
justments. Overall, the more extensive the adjustment, the lower seems the growth in gov-
ernment expenditure. Very large adjustments tend to be associated with negative expenditure 
growth (figure 4).  
 
Table 3: Episodes of fiscal adjustments: Characteristics 
   Consolidation  Successful  Failed 
No. of observations  91  37  54 
Primary balance (% of GDP)  0.85  1.86  0.16 
∆ Primary balance (% of GDP)  2.21  2.17  2.24 
Outlays (% of GDP)  48.49  49.43  47.85 
∆ Outlays (% of GDP) -0.72  -1.51  -0.19 
Revenue (% of GDP)  44.69  46.31  43.58 
∆ Revenue (% of GDP)  1.09  0.75  1.32 
Real GDP Growth  2.46  2.79  2.22 
Real GDP Growth vs. OECD  -0.20  0.02  -0.35 
Real GDP Growth vs. G7  -0.12  0.26  -0.39 
Real interest rate (10 year bond)  4.31  5.07  3.81 
∆ Real interest rate (10 year bond)  0.29  -0.17  0.60 
Gross Debt (% of GDP)  70.19  78.69  64.51 
∆ Debt (% of GDP)  1.30  0.73  1.66 
 
Figure 4: Size of adjustment and change in outlays (62 adjustments, 21 countries, 1970-2009) 
 
Outlays continued to decline in the three years after successful consolidations (table 4), whe-
reas they continued to grow by an average of 0.3 percent in each year after failed adjustments. 
Successful adjustments led to higher average growth, reduced debt by an average of 3.3 per-
centage points each year and also lowered real interest rates. However, debt and interest rates 
continued to climb after unsuccessful adjustments. In a simple correlation, however, higher 11 
 
levels of public debt do not seem to be strongly associated with higher interest rates on gov-
ernment bonds (figure 5).  
 
Table 4: Episodes of successful and unsuccessful fiscal adjustments: Characteristics 
Before During After Before During After
Primary balance (% of GDP) -1.01 1.86 2.72 -1.44 0.16 0.32
∆ Primary balance (% of GDP) -0.14 2.17 -0.14 -0.16 2.24 -0.14
Outlays (% of GDP) 51.78 49.43 47.96 47.13 47.85 48.65
∆ Outlays (% of GDP) -0.06 -1.51 -0.37 0.70 -0.19 0.28
Revenue (% of GDP) 46.21 46.31 47.22 42.15 43.58 44.71
∆ Revenue (% of GDP) -0.10 0.75 -0.18 0.20 1.32 0.13
Real GDP Growth 2.58 2.79 3.00 2.15 2.22 2.47
Real GDP Growth vs. OECD 0.05 0.02 -0.18 -0.18 -0.36 -0.17
Real GDP Growth vs. G7 0.16 0.26 0.30 -0.19 -0.39 -0.04
Interest rate (10 year bond) 10.02 8.65 7.72 11.02 11.70 9.61
∆ Interest rate (10 year bond) -0.30 -1.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.16 -0.54
Real interest rate (10 year bond) 5.11 5.07 4.26 2.90 3.81 4.48
∆ Real interest rate (10 year bond) 0.58 -0.17 -0.22 0.13 0.60 0.35
Gross Debt (% of GDP) 76.50 78.69 69.84 59.57 64.51 67.89




Figure 5: Gross Debt and Real Interest Rates (Full Sample, 21 countries, 1970-2009) 
 
Figure 6 is of particular interest. It shows the development of long-term interest rates for the 
three years before and the three years after a fiscal adjustment took place. A budget consolida-
tion does not generally affect real interest rates. Three years before the adjustment, interest 
rates were almost 250 basis points higher in successful cases. This yield spread narrowed only 
slightly over the following two years to 210 basis points in the year before the adjustment 
took place. With the enactment of consolidation measures, real interest rates quickly con-
verged. Interest rates dropped by an average of 56 basis points per year during successful fis-
cal adjustments while they increased by 31 basis points during failed ones. One year after the 12 
 
consolidation, interest rates were higher in countries that did not return to a path of fiscal sus-
tainability. This yield spread continued to widen in the following two years as debt problems 
persisted or even intensified.  
 
Figure 6: Real Interest Rates before and after budget consolidation 
 
In summary, a look at descriptive statistics suggests that interest rates – and with it debt ser-
vice costs – are considerably influenced by changes in the underlying fiscal variables. Finan-
cial markets seem to respond to measures taken during fiscal adjustments, but it seems to be 
more a question of how the budget consolidation takes place than if it takes place at all as 
depicted in figure 6. It thus appears that financial markets are able to differentiate among the 
wide array of possible fiscal adjustment strategies.  
 
4.  Empirical analysis 
In this section we describe the data used in the empirical analysis, discuss the choice of the 
variables of interest and investigate the time-series properties of the variables. Since the ob-
jective is to explain the level of real long-term interest rates, we use data on the yield of long-
term government bonds adjusted for inflation as the dependent variable. As indicated above, 
data are from the OECD’s Economic Outlook database and usually refer to the 10 year gov-
ernment bond. If a country did not issue 10 year government bonds or data were not available, 
the OECD used data from bonds with similar maturity. We use long-term interest rates instead 
of short-term interest rates because the latter are heavily influenced by monetary policy and 
the business cycle. The long-term interest rate is also a better proxy for debt service costs and 
among other aspects reflects expectations about the future of fiscal policy. We estimate the 13 
 
following linear equation for an unbalanced panel of 21 countries covering the period from 
1970 to 2009: 
 
ri,t = αi,t + β1fi,t + β2ei,t + β3pi,t + εi,t  (1) 
 
Where r is the real long-term interest rate (and the yield spread of long term government bond 
rates versus Germany as another variant) for t = 40 years and i = 21 OECD countries, α is a 
constant, f are key indicators of the fiscal stance, e stands for variables that reflect the eco-
nomic situation and p takes account of different political and institutional factors. The respec-
tive coefficients are β1, β2 and β3. The error term is εt. All variables, their description and 
sources are indicated in Appendix A. The respective descriptive statistics are summarized in 
Appendix B. Finally, the correlation coefficients are presented in Appendix C. Fiscal indica-
tors always refer to the general government and are expressed as a share of GDP. They in-
clude the amount of debt, the change in debt in comparison with the previous year, the pri-
mary deficit, the cyclically adjusted primary deficit, the total deficit, total revenue and total 
expenditure. The nominal short-term interest rate, real GDP growth and the unemployment 
rate constitute the economic factors. They are complemented by the variable banking crisis 
which is a dummy taking the value of 1 if they country was facing a domestic banking crisis 
at a certain point in time. Finally, political and institutional factors include the ideology of the 
parliament, expressed as the share of total seats of left wing and right wing parties, the type of 
currency system with the euro included as a dummy variable and the extent of federalism. 
Another dummy is used for the Bretton Woods system, covering the regime if fixed exchange 
rates between 1970 and 1973. Additional estimates include the fractionalization of the parlia-
ment and the type of the electoral system. We typically also use country dummies as well as 
year dummies. In some estimates, year dummies are substituted with a time trend variable as 
an additional variant.  
 
The stationarity properties of real long-term interest rates, real yield spread, revenue, expendi-
ture, gross debt, real GDP growth and monetary policy were calculated by using the Fisher 
test. Since we do not have complete data for all countries and variables dating back to 1970, 
we are estimating an unbalanced panel and thus cannot rely on standard unit root tests for 
panel data as proposed for example by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). The Fisher test is de-
signed specifically for unbalanced panels and is provided in STATA. The null hypothesis 14 
 
states that the variable is non-stationary. Results of the Fisher test are summarized in Appen-
dix D. The existence of a unit root can be rejected at all levels for the real yield spread and 
real GDP growth. At the 5% significance level, we can reject the hypothesis that the real in-
terest rate and total revenue are non-stationary. The evidence against non-stationarity also 
applies for total expenditure, but only at the 10% level. However, gross debt and monetary 
policy appear to be non-stationary.   The results from the Fisher test allow us to estimate our 
models in levels. Instead of gross debt, we use first differences of gross debt, however.
8  
 
4.1.  Baseline calculations 
In our baseline calculations, we use a fixed-effects estimation technique in levels with country 
fixed effects and year dummies and the real long-term interest rate as the dependent variable. 
Fiscal control variables include the change in total debt, total revenue and total expenditure. 
Economic factors include real GDP growth, the unemployment rate, the short-term interest 
rate and the dummy banking crisis. The political and institutional factors are the euro, ideol-
ogy, federalism and the dummy Bretton Woods. The estimations include 641 observations.  
 
Results show that rapidly rising debt levels are associated with significantly higher long-term 
interest rates (table 5). Economic growth and the unemployment rate as a proxy for structural 
problems also push interest rates higher. Countries that adopted the euro saw their interest 
rates decline significantly (figure 7), while interest rates were much higher during the Bretton 
Woods system. The level of expenditure does not have an influence while the level of total 
taxes and receipts pushes up interest rates. This can be interpreted that financial markets esti-
mate that there is less room for tax increases when solvency becomes a government issue, 
thereby demanding a risk premium if the government is already significantly relying on in-
come and savings from the private sector. Another explanation could be that the majority of 
government bond holders in OECD countries are usually domestic residents.
9 Because high 
deficits make tax increases more likely, wealth of domestic bond holders would be negatively 
affected. Therefore they are no longer willing to lend money at present conditions, pushing 
interest rates higher.  
                                                            
8 An alternative would be to use the primary deficit or cyclically adjusted primary deficit instead of the change in 
gross debt. The null hypothesis according to the Fisher test can be rejected for both variables. We ran calcula-
tions using the primary and cyclically adjusted primary balance as our independent variable. The results were  
very similar in all models estimated (see section 5.2 and table 12 for details).  
9 This is particularly striking in Japan, where in 2008, 94% of all government debt was held by domestic inves-
tors, a result of a strong home bias and risk aversion (Tokuoka, 2010). This is part of the reason why Japan’s 
long-term interest rates remain extremely low despite the highest amount of government debt as a share of GDP 
among all OECD member countries.  15 
 





(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 






     0.18*** 
(5.96) 
     0.18*** 
(5.87) 
GDP growth       0.23*** 
(4.79) 
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(4.84) 
     0.23*** 
(4.80) 
     0.41*** 
(8.50) 
     0.40*** 
(8.36) 
∆ Government debt       0.07*** 
(3.01) 
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(2.14) 
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(4.27) 
     0.17*** 
(4.21) 
     0.32*** 
(6.74) 
















     0.01*** 
(3.56) 
     0.01*** 
(3.58) 
     0.01*** 
(3.57) 
     0.01*** 
(2.98) 




     3.80*** 
(5.15) 
     3.80*** 
(5.14) 
     3.81*** 
(5.16) 
     2.19*** 
(4.04) 
     2.18*** 
(4.02) 
Consolidation (primary)    -0.16 
(-0.85) 
  -0.34 
(-1.58) 
 
Consolidation (cyclical)      -0.16 
(-0.76) 
  -0.11 
(-0.42) 
Country Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
No No 
Trend Dummy  No  No  No 
 
Yes  Yes 
No. of observations  641  641  641 
 
641 641 
R2  0.662  0.662  0.662 
 
0.449  0.447 




t-values in parentheses 
dependent variable: real interest rate 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, interest rates are higher the larger the share of left and right wing parties in the par-
liament. In other words, when centralist parties constitute a majority in the upper house, inter-
est rates tend to be lower than would otherwise be the case.    
 
In a next step, we examined whether the implementation of a budget consolidation affected 
interest rates. For that matter, we defined a dummy taking the value of 1 if a country was in a 
state of fiscal adjustment as determined in section 2.3. We tested for adjustments of both the 
primary deficit and the cyclically adjusted primary deficit, but the results were almost exactly 
identical. Finally, we used a time trend instead of year dummies to test for robustness of our 
                                                            
10 Note: The OECD Economic Outlook database does not provide complete data for all fiscal indicators and for 
all countries since 1970. Hence, the number of observations varies depending on the fiscal variable or fiscal 
adjustment strategy variable used.  16 
 
results. Equations (2) through (5) in table 5 show the regression outputs. In all cases, real 
long-term interest rates were not significantly influenced in either direction if a country was in 
a period of fiscal adjustment. All coefficients had the expected negative sign, but were not 
statistically significant. We obtained the same results if we used the real yield spread as our 
dependent variable instead of the real interest rate (table 6). This is not surprising as fiscal 
adjustments can take many forms and be either successful or unsuccessful in reducing the 
deficit and stabilizing debt. Our next step is thus to distinguish further among various fiscal 
adjustment strategies.   
 




(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 






     0.10*** 
(3.62) 
     0.10*** 
(3.64) 
GDP growth       0.23*** 
(4.79) 
     0.23*** 
(4.84) 
     0.23*** 
(4.80) 
     0.27*** 
(6.04) 
     0.26*** 
(5.91) 
∆ Government debt       0.07*** 
(3.01) 
     0.07*** 
(2.94) 
     0.07*** 
(2.97) 
     0.10*** 
    (4.09) 
     0.10*** 
(4.20) 
Revenue      0.09** 
(2.11) 
   0.09** 
(2.12) 
   0.09** 
(2.14) 
   0.10** 
    (2.29) 
   0.10** 
(2.32) 






  0.06* 
(1.73) 
      0.06* 
   (1.74) 
Euro      -1.02*** 
(-3.50) 
    -1.02*** 
(-3.49) 
   -1.02*** 
(-3.52) 
    -1.31*** 
(-4.61) 
    -1.31*** 
(-4.64) 












     0.17*** 
(4.19) 
     0.17*** 
(4.27) 
     0.17*** 
(4.21) 
     0.23*** 
(5.32) 
















     0.01*** 
(3.56) 
     0.01*** 
(3.58) 
     0.01*** 
(3.57) 
     0.01*** 
(3.24) 




     3.82*** 
(5.17) 
     3.81*** 
(5.16) 
     3.82*** 
(5.18) 
     3.22*** 
(6.45) 
     3.23*** 
(6.46) 
Consolidation (primary)    -0.16 
(-0.85) 
  -0.32 
(-1.62) 
 
Consolidation (cyclical)      -0.16 
(-0.76) 
  -0.30 
(-1.29) 
Country Dummies  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes  No  No 
Trend Dummy  No  No 
 
No  Yes  Yes 
No. of observations  641  641 
 
641 641 641 
R2  0.547  0.547  0.547  0.373  0.372 
 
F-statistic 15.04  14.73  14.72  27.72  27.60 
 
 
t-values in parentheses 
dependent variable: spread vs. Germany 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                            
11 Note: The OECD Economic Outlook database does not provide complete data for all fiscal indicators and for 
all countries since 1970. Hence, the number of observations varies depending on the fiscal variable or fiscal 
adjustment strategy variable used.  
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4.2.  Success and size of fiscal adjustments  
We use three different equations to test whether and how the success (or failure) of a fiscal 
adjustment moved long-term interest rates. In the first model, we include two dummies in our 
regression, taking the value of 1 if the budget consolidation was successful and unsuccessful, 
respectively, as defined in section 2.3. In the second model, we used the same definition, but 
applied to the primary deficit instead of the cyclically adjusted primary deficit. Third, we used 
a different definition for the success of an adjustment. A period of successful fiscal adjust-
ment was defined as a period of consolidation that led to a stabilization of gross debt as a per-
centage of GDP. Holding debt in relation to the size of the economy constant can be sufficient 
for financial sustainability under usual assumptions and is less strict than the required reduc-
tion of 5 percentage points stated in section 2.3. While the number of adjustments remains the 
same under that definition, the share of successful adjustment periods increases from 41 to 53 
percent. The results of our estimations are summarized in table 7. In all three models, the fact 
that a fiscal adjustment was successful did not influence interest rates in a meaningful way. 
The same holds for unsuccessful adjustments from which one could expect that interest rates 
would increase further as seen in figure 6. The results are also stable when we use the real 
yield spread as our dependent variable (table 8). In all cases, the simple fact that a successful 











(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
















GDP growth     0.23*** 
  (4.84) 
   0.23*** 
  (4.79) 
   0.23*** 
  (4.87) 
   0.31*** 
  (6.48) 
     0.28*** 
(5.83) 
     0.30*** 
(6.22) 
     0.29*** 
(6.11) 
     0.27*** 
(5.62) 
∆ Government debt     0.07*** 
  (2.94) 
   0.07*** 
  (2.93) 
   0.06*** 
  (2.90) 
   0.05** 
(2.59) 
     0.06*** 
(2.87) 
   0.05** 
(2.29) 
     0.06*** 
(2.76) 
   0.05** 
(2.19) 
Revenue     0.09** 
(2.14) 
   0.09** 
(2.16) 
   0.09** 
(2.20) 
   0.10** 
(2.59) 
     0.11*** 
(2.79) 
   0.09** 
(2.25) 
   0.09** 
(2.25) 
   0.08** 
(2.04) 
















Euro   -1.02*** 







    -0.87*** 
(-3.11) 
    -1.13*** 
(-4.01) 
   -0.86*** 
(-3.10) 
    -0.96*** 
(-3.34) 


















   0.17*** 
  (4.29) 
   0.17*** 
  (4.21) 
   0.17*** 
  (4.26) 
   0.20*** 
  (4.99) 
     0.20*** 
(5.05) 
     0.18*** 
(4.52) 
     0.18*** 
(4.65) 






















   0.01*** 
  (3.58) 
   0.01*** 
  (3.60) 
   0.01*** 
  (3.62) 
   0.01** 
(2.53) 
   0.01** 
(2.47) 
     0.01*** 
(3.82) 
   0.01** 
(2.49) 




   3.79*** 
  (5.13) 
   3.25*** 
  (4.33) 
   3.80*** 
  (5.15) 
   2.76*** 
  (3.80) 
     5.57*** 
(5.95) 
     1.92*** 
(2.71) 
     4.55*** 
(6.12) 
     3.45*** 
(4.66) 






         






         
∆ Primary deficit         -0.12*** 
 (-2.79) 
       
∆ Adj. primary deficit              -0.20*** 
(-3.57) 
     
∆ Deficit           
 
    -0.14*** 
   (-3.04) 
   
∆ Deficit during adj.           
 
    -0.16* 
(-1.93) 
 
∆ Revenue           
 
    0.05 
(0.80) 
∆ Expenditure            
 
         0.17*** 
(3.27) 
Country Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trend Dummy  No 
 
No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
No. of observations  641 
 
641 641 613  592  631  613  640 
R2  0.663 
 
0.663  0.664  0.712  0.714  0.685  0.710  0.673 
F-statistic 23.39 
 
23.41 23.53 28.65  27.85  26.10  28.36  24.43 
 
t-values in parentheses 
dependent variable: real interest rate 






12 Note: The OECD Economic Outlook database does not provide complete data for all fiscal indicators and for 
all countries since 1970. Hence, the number of observations varies depending on the fiscal variable or fiscal 
adjustment strategy variable used.  
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(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Short-term interest rate     0.10*** 
  (3.54) 
   0.10*** 
  (3.65) 
   0.10*** 
  (3.59) 
   0.16*** 
  (5.52) 
     0.17*** 
(5.81) 
     0.13*** 
(4.65) 
     0.16*** 
(5.48) 
     0.10*** 
(3.61) 
GDP growth     0.27*** 
  (6.05) 
   0.26*** 
  (5.90) 
   0.27*** 
  (6.01) 
   0.36*** 
  (7.43) 
     0.32*** 
(6.83) 
     0.35*** 
(7.40) 
     0.32*** 
(6.97) 
     0.32*** 
(6.93) 
∆ Government debt     0.10*** 
  (4.11) 
   0.10*** 
  (4.18) 
   0.10*** 
  (4.15) 
   0.09*** 
  (3.95) 
     0.10*** 
(4.30) 
     0.09*** 
(3.74) 
     0.10*** 
(4.18) 
     0.08*** 
(3.46) 
Revenue     0.10** 
(2.32) 
   0.10** 
(2.32) 
   0.10** 
(2.36) 
   0.11** 
(2.34) 
   0.11** 
(2.43) 
   0.12** 
(2.59) 
   0.09** 
(2.05) 
   0.11** 
(2.49) 
















Euro   -1.32*** 







    -1.19*** 
(-4.19) 
    -1.43*** 
(-5.13) 
   -1.21*** 
(-4.31) 
    -1.29*** 
(-4.60) 


















   0.23*** 
  (5.33) 
   0.22*** 
  (5.20) 
   0.23*** 
  (5.24) 
   0.26*** 
  (5.86) 
     0.28*** 
(6.07) 
     0.25*** 
(5.87) 
     0.24*** 
(5.42) 






















   0.01*** 
  (3.24) 
   0.01*** 
  (3.22) 
   0.01*** 
  (3.25) 
   0.01** 
(2.47) 
   0.01** 
(2.48) 
     0.01*** 
(3.30) 
   0.01** 
(2.48) 




   3.22*** 
  (6.45) 
   3.23*** 
  (6.45) 
   3.20*** 
  (6.42) 
   3.71*** 
  (7.07) 
     3.90*** 
(6.20) 
     3.41*** 
(6.88) 
     3.80*** 
(7.23) 
     3.18*** 
(6.43) 






         






         
∆ Primary deficit         -0.15*** 
 (-3.15) 
       
∆ Adj. primary deficit              -0.22*** 
   (-3.59) 
     
∆ Deficit           
 
    -0.18*** 
(-3.64) 
   
∆ Deficit during adj.            
 
      -0.21** 
(-2.24) 
 
∆ Revenue           
 
    -0.01 
(-0.08) 
∆ Expenditure            
 
         0.19*** 
(3.38) 
Country Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  No 
 
No No No  No  No  No  No 
Trend Dummy  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of observations  641 
 
641 641 613  592  631  613  640 
R2  0.373 
 
0.372  0.373  0.408  0.413  0.398  0.403  0.386 
F-statistic 25.72 
 
25.60 25.74 30.72  30.14  30.42  30.09  27.20 
 
t-values in parentheses 
dependent variable: yield spread vs. Germany 





13 Note: The OECD Economic Outlook database does not provide complete data for all fiscal indicators and for 
all countries since 1970. Hence, the number of observations varies depending on the fiscal variable or fiscal 
adjustment strategy variable used.  
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This changes when we look at the size of the adjustment as summarized in equations (4) 
through (7) in tables 7 and 8. As expected, the larger the change in the primary balance in 
comparison with the previous fiscal year, the more likely it is that interest rates increased or 
decreased in a significant way. The negative sign suggests that a large improvement in the 
primary balance significantly reduces the real yield of 10 year government bonds. To put it 
differently, if a government suddenly implements a very loose fiscal policy, for example to 
counter falling demand from the private sector during a recession, this is likely to drive up 
interest rates (see also Ardagna, 2009). The results were very similar when we either used the 
change in the total deficit or the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance. In all cas-
es, the coefficient was at least twice as large as the one measuring the effect of an increase in 
debt. Our fiscal adjustment strategy variable is significant at the 1% level in all estimations. 
With our model, roughly 70 percent of the variation in interest rate levels can be explained. In 
equation (7) we focus only on changes in the primary balance when an actual fiscal adjust-
ment took place as defined in section 2.3. In this case, the evidence is less clear. The coeffi-
cient is negative and significant, but only at the 10% level. When using the real yield spread 
as our dependent variable, the results are similar: An improvement of the primary balance 
during a period of fiscal adjustment lowered long-term interest rates. This is what we ex-
pected, but not straight forward. Since debt often continues to increase during the first year of 
consolidation, it could be the case that long-term interest rates respond with a time lag as well. 
The results do not rule out this possibility, but show that interest rates already react during the 
first year of consolidation if the size of the adjustment is substantial.   
 
4.3.  Composition of fiscal adjustments 
We differentiate further among fiscal adjustments by looking at the share and size of changes 
in revenue and expenditure. First, we once again look at the size of measures taken during a 
period of budget consolidation. Unlike before when we simply looked at the change in the 
primary balance in comparison with the previous year, we now distinguish between changes 










(1a)  (1b)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Short-term interest rate  -0.03 
  (-0.95) 
   0.08*** 
  (2.80) 
-0.03 
  (-0.87) 
    -0.03 
   (-0.93) 




     0.00 
    (0.12) 
GDP growth     0.25*** 
  (5.19) 
   0.45*** 
  (8.21) 
   0.25*** 
  (5.21) 
     0.25*** 
(5.25) 
     0.28*** 
(5.76) 
     0.28*** 
(5.74) 
     0.29*** 
(6.10) 
∆ Government debt     0.07*** 
  (3.02) 
 0.07** 
  (2.27) 
   0.06*** 
  (2.86) 
     0.07*** 
(2.94) 
     0.06*** 
(2.76) 
     0.06*** 
(2.67) 
     0.06*** 
(2.80) 
Revenue      0.10** 
  (2.43) 
   0.23*** 
  (4.23) 
 0.10** 
  (2.45) 
     0.10** 
(2.45) 
  0.08* 
(1.89) 
   0.08* 
(1.90) 
     0.09** 
(2.27) 
Expenditure   0.02 
(0.60) 
   0.09* 
(1.95) 
    0.02 
   (0.70) 







(0.60)    






    -0.87*** 
(-2.99) 
   -1.04*** 
  (-3.65) 
    -1.06*** 
(-3.70) 
    -0.84*** 
(-3.03) 
Banking crisis  0.00 
(0.01) 














   0.15*** 
  (3.80) 
   0.35*** 
  (6.31) 
   0.15*** 
  (3.67) 
     0.15*** 
(3.78) 
     0.16*** 
(4.11) 
     0.16*** 
(4.08) 




















   0.01*** 
  (3.47) 
   0.01*** 
  (2.81) 
   0.01*** 
  (3.53) 
     0.01*** 
(3.50) 
     0.01*** 
(3.70) 
     0.01*** 
(3.70) 




   3.14*** 
  (4.23) 
     3.74** 
   (5.11) 
     3.12** 
(4.19) 
     3.47*** 
(4.69) 
     4.09*** 
(5.58) 
     4.53*** 
(6.09) 






         
∆ Exp. during fiscal adj. 
 
    0.14* 
   (1.74) 
  0.20* 
(1.83) 
         
∆ Rev. successful adj.   
 




     
∆ Exp. successful adj.   
 
   0.23* 
   (1.89) 
   0.23* 
(1.93) 
     
∆ Rev. failed adj.   
 
    0.04 
(0.29) 
     
∆ Exp. failed adj.   
 
    0.10 
(0.95) 
     
Share ∆ Exp.    
 
         -0.61* 
(-1.89) 
   
Exp. based adjustment    
 
          -0.45* 
(-1.71) 
 
Rev. based adjustment   
 
        -0.25 
(-0.90) 
 
∆ Deficit exp. based   
 
              -0.24** 
(-2.05) 
∆ Deficit rev. based    
 
          -0.06 
(-0.57) 
Country Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trend Dummy  No 
 
No  No  No  No  No  No 
No. of observations  629 
 
599  629  629  625  625  613 
R2  0.676  0.677  0.676 
 
0.677  0.684  0.684  0.710 
F-statistic  24.30  24.78  24.33 
 
23.34  25.66  25.08  27.76 
 
t-values in parentheses 
dependent variable: real interest rate 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                            
14 Note: The OECD Economic Outlook database does not provide complete data for all fiscal indicators and for 
all countries since 1970. Hence, the number of observations varies depending on the fiscal variable or fiscal 
adjustment strategy variable used.  
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Overall, discretionary tax increases during adjustments do not seem to affect long-term inter-
est rates in the short run. On the other hand, expenditure cuts reduce long-term interest rates 
and henceforth debt service costs. The effect becomes larger and remains significant when we 
limit our sample to the period after the Bretton Woods system (1b). In this case, the coeffi-
cient of expenditure cuts is almost three times as large as the one measuring the effect of 
changes in total debt.  
 
Our next step is to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful fiscal adjustments and 
their respective changes in revenue and expenditure as summarized in equations (2) and (3). 
We find that discretionary fiscal policy significantly influences real interest rates, but only 
during successful fiscal adjustments. Changes in expenditure during failed adjustments do not 
affect the real yield on government bonds. As described in table 3, we assume that this is be-
cause in the past 40 years, outlays have changed only very little during failed adjustments. On 
the other hand, tax and non-tax receipts were raised substantially, but this did not shift interest 
rates in either direction. Changes in revenue during successful adjustments also do not have 
an effect on long-term interest rates. Overall, the results of section 4.2 are confirmed. Indeed, 
it is the size of the adjustment that matters, but this statement only holds when we look at the 
expenditure side of the government budget. Tax increases, although substantial during some 
adjustments, do not seem to influence interest yields in the short run. We obtain the same re-
sults when we use the real yield spread as our dependent variable and substitute the year 
dummies with a time trend variable (table 10). The only difference is visible in equation (3): 
Expenditure cuts affected interest rates even during unsuccessful adjustments. The effect is 
smaller than during successful adjustments, however, and the variable is only significant at 
the 10% level.  
 
Equation (4) includes the share of measures taken through expenditure cuts. This variable 
takes the value of zero if the consolidation was based entirely upon tax increases. It is one, if 
revenue was left unchanged and the improvement in the primary balance was completely due 
to expenditure cuts. Using that definition, the size of the adjustment does not matter. Descrip-
tive statistics show that historically, roughly two thirds of the improvement in the primary 
balance during consolidation was due to tax increases while expenditure cuts contributed only 
one third.  23 
 





(1a)  (1b)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Short-term interest rate     0.11*** 
  (3.81) 
   0.12*** 
  (3.92) 
   0.11*** 
  (3.90) 
     0.11*** 
(3.76) 
     0.13*** 
(4.40) 
     0.13*** 
(4.39) 
     0.16*** 
    (5.28) 
GDP growth     0.29*** 
  (6.48) 
   0.29*** 
  (6.24) 
   0.29*** 
  (6.36) 
     0.29*** 
(6.50) 
     0.31*** 
(6.67) 
     0.30*** 
(6.61) 
     0.32*** 
(6.99) 
∆ Government debt     0.10*** 
  (4.18) 
   0.11*** 
  (4.28) 
   0.10*** 
  (4.02) 
     0.10*** 
(4.15) 
     0.10*** 
(4.13) 
     0.10*** 
(4.07) 
     0.10*** 
(4.19) 
Revenue      0.11** 
  (2.44) 
   0.12*** 
  (2.65) 
  0.11** 
  (2.38) 
     0.11** 
(2.48) 
  0.08* 
(1.87) 
   0.08* 
(1.85) 
     0.09** 
(2.10) 
Expenditure    0.07* 
(1.85) 
  0.07* 
(1.77) 
 0.08** 
  (2.07) 
  0.07* 
(1.85) 
   0.08** 
(2.08) 
    0.08** 
(2.08) 
  0.08* 
(2.08)    






    -1.23*** 
(-4.31) 
   -1.36*** 
  (-4.81) 
    -1.36*** 
(-4.81) 
    -1.21*** 
(-4.31) 
















   0.22*** 
  (5.09) 
   0.24*** 
  (5.25) 
   0.21*** 
  (4.85) 
     0.22*** 
(5.08) 
     0.23*** 
(5.40) 
     0.23*** 
(5.36) 




















   0.01*** 
  (3.19) 
   0.01*** 
  (3.03) 
   0.01*** 
  (3.22) 
     0.01*** 
(3.19) 
     0.01*** 
(3.33) 
     0.01*** 
(3.32) 




   3.24*** 
  (6.49) 
     3.24*** 
  (6.49) 
     3.23*** 
(6.46) 
     3.47*** 
(6.89) 
     3.47*** 
(6.89) 
     3.76*** 
(7.14) 






         
∆ Exp. during fiscal adj. 
 
   0.26*** 
  (2.84) 
   0.27*** 
  (2.96) 
         
∆ Rev. successful adj.   
 




     
∆ Exp. successful adj.   
 
     0.32** 
(2.42) 
   0.33** 
(2.48) 
     
∆ Rev. failed adjustment   
 
    0.06 
(0.39) 
     
∆ Exp. failed adjustment   
 
     0.20* 
(1.74) 
     
Share ∆ Exp.    
 
          -0.74** 
(-2.05) 
   
Exp. based adjustment    
 
        -0.53* 
(-1.79) 
 
Rev. based adjustment   
 
        -0.17 
(-0.56) 
 
∆ Deficit exp. based   
 
              -0.33** 
(-2.47) 
∆ Deficit rev. based   
 
          -0.07 
(-0.55) 
Country Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  No 
 










Trend Dummy  Yes 
 










No. of observations  629 
 
599  629  629  625  625  613 
R2  0.380 
 
0.389  0.377  0.381  0.389  0.386  0.404 
F-statistic  25.95 
 
27.61  25.67  22.72  28.64  26.45  28.04 
 
 
t-values in parentheses 
dependent variable: yield spread vs. Germany 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                            
15 Note: The OECD Economic Outlook database does not provide complete data for all fiscal indicators and for 
all countries since 1970. Hence, the number of observations varies depending on the fiscal variable or fiscal 
adjustment strategy variable used.  
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Our regression results indicate that long-term interest rates will tend to be lower the larger the 
share of expenditure cuts. The size of the coefficient is particularly striking. The effect is lar-
ger than an increase in real GDP growth by more than 2 percentage points and similar to an 
increase in total debt by 10 percentage points.  
 
In equation (5) we use two dummies to define whether the fiscal adjustment undertaken was 
either revenue or expenditure based. A revenue based adjustment is defined as a period of 
budget consolidation during which tax increases account for more than 50 percent of the im-
provement in the primary balance. All other adjustments are then defined as expenditure 
based. We find that expenditure based adjustments significantly lower the real return on gov-
ernment bonds while budget consolidations based primarily on tax increases do not.  
 
Finally, we combined the size of the adjustment with the distinction whether the adjustment 
was primarily revenue or expenditure based. As expected, expenditure based adjustments sig-
nificantly dampen long-term interest rates. Revenue based adjustments do not lead to changes 
in yields, even when the size of the adjustment is taken into account. Alternatively, we ran 
calculations using the yield spread between the country observed and German bunds while 
substituting the year dummies once again with a time trend variable. While not entirely com-
parable with each other, we find that difference in long-term interest rates become smaller if 
large and expenditure based fiscal adjustments are implemented. Our results were almost 
identical when we used the same model as in table 9, but with the real yield spread as our de-
pendent variable.  
 
5.  Discussion  
The results obtained in section 4 are robust to an array of changes in specification. In this sec-
tion, we extend the analysis by using an IV-model to account for possible endogeneity of our 
consolidation variables, performing robustness checks by controlling for additional political 
and institutional measures and by using a different measure for the dependent variable. 
 
5.1.  Endogeneity and instrumental variables  
A potential problem with our model could be endogeneity, that one or more of our independ-
ent variables are correlated with the error term. This would imply that the regression coeffi-
cients in our fixed-effects regression are biased. By assuming fixed effects, time independent 
effects are imposed for each country that are potentially correlated with the regressors. A 25 
 
commonly used method to overcome the potential problem of endogeneity is to include in-
strumental variables in the regression. The Wu-Hausman test did not consistently show a need 
for instrumental variables, however, as the null hypothesis that the regressor is exogenous 
could only be rejected in some cases (depending on the model used). Nonetheless, we used 
the total deficit and the total debt level as an instrument for our fiscal adjustment variables 
since it can be debated whether these two variables should have explanatory power in the 
original regression.
16 The idea is that a fiscal adjustment often takes place when deficits and 
debt levels are substantial, independent of the question which political party is in charge and 
which fiscal policy it would otherwise prefer. In the first stage regression, the coefficient of 
the total debt level is significant at the 1% level in all four models estimated. The coefficient 
of the total deficit is significant at the 1% level as well, but only in two models. The estima-
tion results are summarized in Appendix E. We also tested whether our model is either unde-
ridentified as measured by Anderon’s canonical correlation test or is suffering from overiden-
tifying restrictions as examined by the Sargan test. The results show that our IV variables are 
appropriate. The results of the corresponding two stage least squares estimations are summa-
rized in table 11.  
 
All four models tested show similar results as the fixed-effects regressions did. In the first 
model, the previous result holds that the success of a fiscal adjustment alone was not suffi-
cient to affect long-term interest rates. On the other hand, the size of the adjustment as exam-
ined in equations (2) and (3) significantly lowers debt service costs. Finally, the composition 
of the adjustment is of relevance. Equation (4) confirms that the share of expenditure cuts is 
important in determining changes in interest rate levels. The higher the percentage of expendi-
ture cuts of total changes in the primary balance, the larger will be the change in long-term 




16 As the OECD (2009a) points out, the effect of fiscal imbalances on interest rates is both mixed and controver-
sial. Examples cited often include Japan with the highest level of government debt and the lowest level of inter-
est rates among all OECD countries as well as Australia and New Zealand with long-term interest rates close to  
6 percent despite very low debt levels of 20 and 31 percent of GDP, respectively. Caporale and Williams (2002) 
as well as Ardagna et al. (2004) even find a negative and statistically significant relationship between the stock 
of public debt and long-term interest rates. Recent findings in the economic literature also suggest that future 
fiscal deficits rather than current ones have an effect on interest rates (i.e. Laubach, 2003).  26 
 





(1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b)  (4a)  (4b) 
Short-term interest rate  0.00 




   (0.80) 
0.01 
(0.24) 




     -0.05 
    (-1.05) 
     -0.03 
(-0.79) 
GDP growth     0.29*** 
  (5.41) 
   0.23*** 
  (4.81) 
   0.42*** 
  (6.41) 
     0.32*** 
(6.54) 
     0.30*** 
(5.69) 
     0.29*** 
(5.89) 
     0.35*** 
(5.15) 
     0.29*** 
(5.83) 
∆ Government debt     0.07*** 
  (2.75) 
   0.07*** 
  (3.21) 
   0.05** 
  (2.28) 
     0.06*** 
(2.87) 
     0.05** 
(2.05) 
     0.06*** 
(2.94) 
     0.07*** 
(2.63) 
     0.07*** 
(2.98) 
Revenue    0.08* 
(1.85) 
  0.09** 
(2.19) 
   0.17*** 
  (3.46) 
     0.11*** 
(2.70) 
     0.19*** 
(3.34) 
     0.11*** 
(2.66) 
     0.12** 
(2.26) 
    0.08** 
(2.02) 




    -0.02 








(0.43)    
0.03 
(0.89) 
Euro   -0.88*** 
  (-2.60) 
 -1.03*** 
  (-3.51) 
 -0.90*** 
 (-3.18) 
    -0.88*** 
(-3.17) 
   -0.87*** 
    (-2.88) 
    -0.87*** 
(-3.07) 
   -0.82** 
(-2.26) 
   -1.04*** 
   (-3.61) 


















   0.19*** 
  (4.21) 
   0.18*** 
  (4.37) 
   0.25*** 
  (5.53) 
     0.20*** 
(5.13) 
     0.25*** 
(5.39) 
     0.21*** 
(5.24) 
     0.22*** 
(4.05) 






















   0.01*** 
   (2.83) 
   0.01*** 
  (3.38) 
   0.01**   
(2.52) 
   0.01** 
(2.42) 
     0.01** 
(2.33) 
   0.01** 
(2.43) 
     0.01*** 
(3.08) 
     0.01*** 
(3.48) 




           
∆ Primary deficit   
 
   -0.48*** 
(-2.92) 
    -0.12*** 
 (-2.79) 
       
∆ Adj. primary deficit   
 
         -0.83*** 
(-2.85) 
    -0.19*** 
(-3.30) 
   
Share ∆ Exp.    
 
             -6.30** 
(-2.05) 
   -0.68** 
(-2.09) 
Country Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trend Dummy  No 
 
No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
No. of observations  602 
 
602  586  586  572  572  595  595 
F-statistic 20.29 
 
24.30  26.22  29.43 22.80 28.44 16.88 26.25 
  IV 
(2SLS) 
OLS  IV 
(2SLS) 
OLS  IV  
(2SLS) 





Note: Instruments are the total deficit and total debt 
t-values in parentheses 
dependent variable: real interest rate  




5.2.  Different fiscal, political and institutional measures  
To further test the robustness of our results from section 4, we use alternative and additional 
variables. First, we use the budget balance instead of the growth in debt as our variable for the 
fiscal stance. The corresponding correlation coefficient between the two is -0.563. Next, we 
omit the expenditure variable since government revenue and government expenditure are 
                                                            
17 Note: The OECD Economic Outlook database does not provide complete data for all fiscal indicators and for 
all countries since 1970. Hence, the number of observations varies depending on the fiscal variable or fiscal 
adjustment strategy variable used.  
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highly correlated (c = 0.894) and might thus negatively affect our estimation results. Third, 
we add two additional variables to account for differences in the political system. We include 
a fractionalization variable that measures the probability that two randomly chosen deputies 
from among the government parties will be of different parties. The regime type variable cap-
tures whether the country observed is presidential, assembly-elected presidential or parlia-
mentary. Four of our previously defined fiscal adjustment strategies are examined. The results 
are summarized in table 12. The number of observations is slightly lower than in previous 
estimations because the additional political variables only cover the period 1975-2006.  
 
Equations (1a) and (1b) show that the share of expenditure as a percentage of the total im-
provement in the primary balance continues to be significant for both the long-term interest 
rate as well as for the yield spread. The budget balance variable is highly significant, meaning 
that a high deficit is associated with higher interest rates. The political variables are also of 
interest. Our previous result that the more seats the left- and right wing parties have, the high-
er interest rates will be, still holds. Parliamentary regimes tend to be associated with higher 
interest rates in comparison with presidential or assembly-elected presidential systems. The 
latter include the United States covering the entire period from 1970 to 2009 as well as 
Greece, Portugal and Spain during the 1970’s and early 1980’s. This result thus needs to be 
interpreted with care.  
  
In our second and third equation, we once again test for the size of the fiscal adjustment. A 
substantial improvement of the cyclically adjusted primary balance will lower the long-term 
interest rate and hence also debt service costs. Revenue based adjustments, although large in 
some cases, do not affect interest rates and yield spreads at all. On the other hand, expenditure 
based adjustments are found to be associated with lower rates. All other control variables are 
in line with our previous results. Finally, the negative effect of successful adjustments on in-
terest rates can be attributed to changes in expenditure. Changes in revenue during successful 
adjustments do not seem to influence debt service costs.  
 
Overall, our previous results are thus confirmed and seem to be robust. Our fiscal adjustment 
strategy variables were found to be significant in all equations. Additionally, we found evi-
dence that political factors might be just as important as economic and fiscal indicators when 
determining interest rates and yield spreads.    
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(1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b)  (4a)  (4b) 
Short-term interest rate     0.01 
  (0.36) 
   0.18*** 
  (5.95) 
  0.07* 
(1.96) 
     0.21*** 
(6.75) 
      0.02 
(0.54) 
     0.18*** 
(6.20) 
     0.01 
    (0.17) 
     0.17*** 
(5.76) 
GDP growth     0.26*** 
  (5.35) 
   0.21*** 
  (4.49) 
   0.25*** 
  (5.47) 
     0.21*** 
(4.62) 
     0.27*** 
(6.06) 
     0.22*** 
(5.09) 
     0.28*** 
(6.25) 
     0.23*** 
(5.22) 






    -0.15*** 
(-4.07) 
   -0.11*** 
(-3.59) 
    -0.17*** 
(-4.98) 
    -0.12*** 
(-3.76) 
    -0.18*** 
(-5.10) 
Revenue      0.09*** 
  (2.82) 
   0.12*** 
  (3.56) 
   0.07** 
(2.51) 
     0.10*** 
(2.92) 
     0.08*** 
(2.83) 
     0.12*** 
(3.93) 
     0.08*** 
(2.97) 
     0.12*** 
(3.95) 






    -1.22*** 
(-4.03) 
   -1.00*** 
   (-3.59) 
    -1.23*** 
(-4.45) 
    -1.09*** 
(-3.97)    
    -1.31*** 
(-4.79) 
Unemployment rate     0.19*** 
  (4.26) 
   0.25*** 
  (5.19) 
   0.20*** 
  (4.84) 
     0.30*** 
(5.93) 
     0.20*** 
(4.96) 
     0.26*** 
(5.81) 
    0.19*** 
    (4.78) 
     0.25*** 
(5.68) 
Ideology     0.01** 
(2.20) 
   0.01*** 





  0.01* 
(1.90) 
     0.01*** 
(2.62) 
   0.01** 
(2.34) 
     0.01*** 
(2.88) 
Fractionalization     -0.93* 
  (-1.86) 
 -0.92* 
(-1.66) 
   -1.00** 
(-2.23) 
  -1.01** 
(-1.90) 
    -0.98** 
(-2.16) 
     -0.99* 
(-1.93) 
     -0.84* 
(-1.84) 
   -0.94* 
(-1.82) 
Regime type     3.56*** 
  (8.88) 
   3.50*** 
  (7.85) 
   2.61*** 
  (3.45) 
   2.16** 
(2.47) 
     2.21*** 
(5.69) 
     2.21*** 
(5.51) 
     2.46*** 
(4.46) 
     2.12*** 
(3.37) 
Share ∆ Exp.   -0.58* 
  (-1.71) 
   -0.63** 
(-1.70) 
           
∆ Adj. primary deficit       -0.15*** 
 (-2.62) 
    -0.19*** 
   (-3.02) 
    
∆ Deficit exp. based   
 
          -0.28** 
(-2.45) 
    -0.33*** 
   (-2.66) 
   
∆ Deficit rev. based   
 





∆ Exp. successful adj.                 0.29** 
(2.58) 
     0.35*** 
(2.85) 
∆ Rev. failed adj.              0.10 
(0.57) 
     -0.01 
(-0.07) 
Country Dummies  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes 
 
No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Trend Dummy  No 
 
Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
No. of observations  568 
 
568  541  541  561  561  561  561 
R2  0.680 
 
0.428  0.689  0.381  0.700  0.420  0.699  0.400 
F-statistic  26.17 
 
36.49  25.83  28.48  27.60  31.90  27.57  29.34 
 
t-values in parentheses 
dependent variable: real interest rate in equations (a), real yield spread in equations (b) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
5.3.  Alternative dependent variable 
In section 4 we calculated the real interest rate by taking the yield on long-term government 
bonds and subtracting the annual inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index. We 
ran alternative calculations by using the GDP deflator as calculated by the OECD instead of 
the consumer price index. The results for the adjustment strategy variables as well as for the 
various control variables were very similar. A large fiscal adjustment significantly reduces the 
                                                            
18 Note: The OECD Economic Outlook database does not provide complete data for all fiscal indicators and for 
all countries since 1970. Hence, the number of observations varies depending on the fiscal variable or fiscal 
adjustment strategy variable used.  
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long-term interest rates. Substantial expenditure cuts are important to reduce debt service 
costs. Tax increases of similar magnitude do not lead to lower interest rates. Economic growth 
and structural problems as expressed by the unemployment rate both raise real government 
bond yields. An increase in government debt or a high fiscal burden has a similar effect. A 
large share of left and right wing politicians also pushes up interest rates.  Federalism on the 
other hand does not have a significant effect. These results are not surprising given the fact 
that the GDP deflator and the consumer price index are highly correlated with each other. The 
corresponding correlation coefficient is 0.946.  
 
5.4.  Distribution of residuals  
A potential problem could arise if our residuals are not normally distributed. In that case, at 
least one explanatory variable or the dependent variable may be wrongly specified. We used 
the Shapiro-Wilk test which tests the null hypothesis that a given sample is normally distrib-
uted. While the Shapiro Wilk W-statistic is often close to one, the p-value leads us to reject 
the null hypothesis at least in some estimations. However, the qualitative nature of our results 
remains unchanged, even when the null hypothesis can be rejected. The p-value is greater 
than 0.05 when we use a trend variable instead of year dummies. We can thus no longer reject 
the null hypothesis that the data are from a normally distributed population. In this case, our 
results remain stable.   
 
6.  Conclusions  
This paper focuses on periods of fiscal adjustments in 21 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009. 
It shows that historically, governments have employed different fiscal adjustment strategies  
when confronted with high deficits and rising debt. Accordingly, these measures not only dif-
fer in duration, size and composition, but also in their success. Controlling for various eco-
nomic, fiscal and political factors, we find that the size and the composition of a fiscal ad-
justment significantly affect long-term interest rates as well as yield spreads. Large adjust-
ments and those that mainly depend on expenditure cuts lead to substantially lower interest 
rates. On the other hand, a budget consolidation that predominantly relied on tax increases, or 
on modest and gradual measures – even it was successful and led to lower deficits and debt 
levels – did not have an influence on interest rates. These results are significant and are robust 
to a variety of specifications and alternative models. We thus conclude that financial markets 
only seem to value strict and decisive measures. Therefore, expenditure cuts are a clear sign 
that the government’s pledge to cut the deficit is credible. Since financial markets participants 30 
 
cannot foresee whether the adjustment will be successful and carried out as announced, they 
will continue to demand higher yields unless the government sends a clear signal by cutting 
expenditure.      
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Appendix A: Data and Sources 
Variable Description  Sources 
Real interest rate  Yield on long-term government 
bonds (10 year) minus inflation as 
measured by the consumer price 
index in percent 
OECD Economic Outlook  
Real interest spread  Differences in real interest rates 
between the country observed and 
Germany in percentage points 
OECD Economic Outlook 
Monetary policy  Nominal short-term interest rates (3 
month interest rate) set by central 
banks in percent 
OECD Economic Outlook 
Real GDP Growth  Annual growth in real gross domes-
tic product in percent 
OECD Economic Outlook 
Public Debt  Gross Financial Liabilities as a Per-
centage of Nominal GDP 
OECD Economic Outlook 
Revenue  Total general government tax and 
non-tax receipts as a percentage of 
Nominal GDP 
OECD Economic Outlook 
Expenditure  Total general government expendi-
ture as a percentage of GDP 
OECD Economic Outlook 
Euro  Dummy variable, taking the value of 
1 if the country had adopted the Eu-
ro in a given year 
European Central Bank 
Banking crisis  Dummy variable, taking the value of 
1 if the country was facing a na-
tional crisis in a given year 
Reinhart und Rogoff (2009) 
Primary balance  General government balance as a 
percentage of potential GDP ad-
justed for the cycle and for one-offs 
and excluding net interest payments 
OECD Economic Outlook 
Budget balance  General government balance as a 
percentage of nominal GDP includ-
ing one-offs 
OECD Economic Outlook 
Cyclically adjusted 
balance 
General government balance as a 
percentage of potential GDP ad-
justed for the cycle and one-offs 
OECD Economic Outlook 34 
 
Ideology  Right and left party cabinet portfo-
lios as a percentage of total cabinet 
posts, weighted by the days the gov-
ernment was in office in a given 
year 
Armingeon et al. (2009) 
Federalism  Degree of federalism taking the val-
ue 0 if the system of a given country 
is not federal, 1 if there is weak fed-
eralism and 2 if there is strong fed-
eralism 
Huber et al. (2004) 
Unemployment rate  Harmonized unemployment rate as a 
percentage of the civilian labor force
OECD Economic Outlook 
Fractionalization  The probability that two randomly 
chosen deputies from among the 
government parties will be of differ-
ent parties 
Beck et al. (2001), Keefer (2007) 
Regime type  Captures whether countries are pres-
idential, assembly-elected presiden-
tial or parliamentary 


























Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Minimum Maximum 
       
Real interest rate  2.797 3.406 -19.146  11.185 
Real interest spread  -0.835 3.070  -21.945 8.405 
Monetary policy  7.587 4.721 0.029  24.900 
Real GDP growth  2.675 2.564 -7.470  11.490 
Public Debt  59.969 29.884 4.100  189.300 
Revenue  41.382 8.677  22.200  64.800 
Expenditure  43.764 9.230  19.300  70.900 
Euro  0.155 0.362 0.000  1.000 
Banking crisis  0.080 0.271 0.000  1.000 
Primary balance  -0.088 3.030  -11.600 9.530 
Budget balance  -2.560 3.945  -15.960 7.812 
Cyclically adjusted balance  -0.025 2.812  -9.160  8.030 
Ideology  72.640 31.729 0.000  100.000 
Federalism  0.517 0.820 0.000  2.000 
Unemployment rate  6.126 3.539 0.000  19.500 
Fractionalization  0.282 0.277 0.000  0.830 
Regime type  1.835 0.533 0.000  2.000 
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Appendix C: Correlations 
 













































































































































































































Real  interest  rate  1.000                     
Spread  0.865  1.000                    
Monetary  policy  0.314  0.127  1.000                   
Real  GDP  growth  0.060  -0.015  -0.154  1.000                  
Debt  0.115  0.117  -0.174  -0.119  1.000                 
∆  Debt  0.152  0.164  0.182  -0.440  0.122  1.000                
Revenue  0.202 0.222 -0.054 -0.177 0.118 -0.080 1.000                     
Expenditure    0.298 0.292 0.087 -0.304 0.339 0.162 0.899 1.000                   
Euro    -0.349 -0.179 -0.435 0.076 0.060 -0.224 0.084 -0.016 1.000                 
Banking  crisis  0.162 0.101 0.201 -0.220 -0.002 0.248 -0.021 0.057 -0.158 1.000               
∆  Adj.  deficit  0.063 0.008 0.069 0.072 0.110 -0.047 0.073 0.075 -0.103  -0.079 1.000             
Federalism  -0.083 -0.055 -0.173 -0.064 -0.024 -0.030 -0.271 -0.275 -0.046  -0.018  -0.017  1.000         
Ideology  0.110 0.113 -0.002 0.032 -0.145 -0.063 -0.005 -0.092 0.000 0.066 -0.004 -0.216 1.000         
Unemployment  0.329 0.304 0.217 -0.003 0.270 0.112 0.031 0.190 -0.020 0.100 0.116 -0.087  -0.076 1.000       
Budget  balance  -0.253 -0.197 -0.314 0.291 -0.486 -0.562 0.161 -0.270 0.227 -0.175 0.007 0.002 0.180 -0.378  1.000     
Fractionalization 0.025 0.035 -0.148  -0.117 0.064 0.012 0.431 0.382 0.076 -0.035  -0.004  -0.042  -0.174  -0.115  0.085  1.000   






Appendix D: Tests for stationarity  
 
  Fisher Test for unbalanced panels  
  H0: Unit root, non-stationarity 
    
Variable  Chi2  Prob > Chi2 
    
Real Interest Rate  62.27**  0.0227 
Real Yield Spread  89.44***  0.0000 
Revenue (% of GDP)  63.48**  0.0177 
Expenditure (% of GDP)  55.38*  0.0809 
Gross Debt (% of GDP)  26.11  0.9740 
Real GDP Growth  243.51***  0.0000 
Monetary Policy  32.99  0.8388 
 
 




(1a)  (2a)  (3a)  (4a) 
First stage regressions 
 
Deficit  0.01 
(0.68) 
  0.25*** 
     (3.46) 
  0.16*** 
     (2.81) 
0.01 
(1.14) 
Debt    0.00*** 
    (3.34) 
  0.03*** 
     (5.41) 
  0.02*** 
     (3.77) 
  0.00*** 
     (2.65) 
Summary results 
 
Shea partial R2  0.022 
 
0.077  0.045  0.016 
F-statistic  5.90  21.77 
 
11.82  4.36 
p-value  0.003  0.000 
 
0.000  0.013 
Anderson’s CC test  12.52 
 
43.65  24.59  9.30 
p-value 
 
0.003  0.000  0.000  0.010 
Sargan statistic     9.71 
 





0.005  0.015  0.004 









t-values in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 